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The Future of the Scientific Realism Debate:




“Philosophy,” Plato’s Socrates said, “begins in wonder” (Theaetetus,
155d). Two and a half millennia later, Alfred North Whitehead saw fit to
add: “And, at the end, when philosophical thought has done its best, the
wonder remains” (1938, 168). Nevertheless, we tend to no longer wonder
about many questions that would have stumped (if not vexed) the ancients:
“Why does water expand when it freezes?”
“How can one substance change into another?”
“What allows the sun to continue to shine so brightly, day after
day, while all other sources of light and warmth exhaust their fuel
sources at a rate in proportion to their brilliance?”
Whitehead’s addendum to Plato was not wrong, however, in the sense
that we derive our answers to such questions from the theories, models, and
methods of modern science, not the systems, speculations, and arguments
of modern philosophy. Like philosophy, science often begins in wonder; but
when scientific inquiry has done its best, it would seem, the wonder does not
always remain.
Ex cathedra, the scientific image of reality found in our current best
scientific theories, inculcated in our science classrooms, and artfully presented
through more popular media proffers far more answers than, say, Aristotle’s
treatises on natural philosophy ever could; these answers, furthermore,
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seem vastly more precise, accurate, deep, consilient, elegant, empirically
sound, and widely accepted than any given by the modern scientific
worldview’s alternatives and predecessors. Making sense of reality through
the lenses of our current best scientific theories can leave a curious person
feeling immensely proud of our collective epistemic achievements, incredibly
intellectually satisfied, and utterly convinced that the picture of reality
painted by these theories is true (at least approximately speaking).
But philosophers can’t help wondering: is that picture true, even as an
approximation? Is our world really the way modern physical theory describes
it, abuzz with various unobservable (though perhaps detectable) entities
whose causal interactions make everything appear to us as it does? Is it the
aim of empirical science to discover some hidden reality behind our everyday
experience, and thereby satisfy our wonder? Is that even possible?
These are distinctly philosophical questions, for although they are
questions about the epistemic outcomes, long-term potential, and ultimate
aims of scientific inquiry, scientific inquiry itself is unable to answer
them satisfactorily. The theories of modern science, taken as true, provide
extremely satisfying explanations when we wonder why ice has more volume
than water, why iron turns to rust, or why the sun keeps shining day after day.
But when we wonder whether these theories are true, whether the methods of
empirical science could ever help us arrive at true theories in the first place,
or whether scientific inquiry even aims to arrive at such theories, we have
reached the limits of science and entered the domain of philosophy.
“Scientific realism” refers to any philosophical thesis that constitutes an
affirmative answer to one or more of the questions above, e.g., by asserting
that the theories of modern science paint an approximately true picture
of unobservable reality, that scientific inquiry is capable of arriving at
approximately true theories (even if it hasn’t yet), and/or that the governing
aim of scientific inquiry is to arrive at such theories (even if it never will).
Whether they understand it as a metaphysical, epistemological, or axiological
thesis, casual observation suggests that the average person finds some form
of scientific realism to be intuitively correct; formal surveys establish that
most academic philosophers do as well (Bourget and Chalmers 2014, 481).
Nevertheless, realist interpretations of science certainly have their
detractors, and the ongoing debate between realists and anti-realists has been
a central part of philosophical thinking about science for at least the last
four decades. Thinking earnestly about the merits of scientific realism now
requires navigating contentious historiographical issues, being familiar with
the technical details of various scientific theories, and addressing disparate
philosophical problems spanning aesthetics, metaphysics, epistemology, and
beyond. For all these reasons, reviewing the extant literature on the topic
can be both fascinating and frustrating. With that in mind, this special
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issue of Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and Philosophy
of Science collects over twenty invited and peer-reviewed papers under the
title “The Future of the Scientific Realism Debate: Contemporary Issues
Concerning Scientific Realism.” It was organized in the hope of providing
a suitable forum for everyone to pause, catch their breath, and share their
current thoughts on this topic. It should present a suitable place for any
newly interested party to enter the debate and begin to make sense of the
existing literature. Deeply immersed veterans whose thinking has shaped the
course of the debate in recent years should find this collection valuable as
well, including those who have contributed to it.
Ultimately the hope is that this collection will help all curious parties
better understand, appreciate, and reflect on the evolution of the scientific
realism debate, its current state, and how we might move it forward fruitfully.
I will count this collection as a success, however, so long as a few others find
it as enjoyable to read as I have, even if, at the end, the shared wonder that
drives the scientific realism debate remains.
II. Articles
For such a thoroughly discussed topic, it might seem strange that ANJAN
CHAKRAVARTTY and BAS VAN FRAASSEN—the former a champion of
scientific realism and the latter an opponent—have contributed a dialogue
entitled “What is Scientific Realism?” investigating that very question.
Scientific realism now comes in a variety of subtypes—semirealism, structural
realism, entity realism, etc.—as its defenders have tweaked, qualified, and
clarified the basic position to fend off various anti-realist challenges. But as
Chakravartty and van Fraassen’s conversation makes clear, more abstract
differences between people’s conceptions of scientific realism have not
always been sufficiently appreciated. Thankfully, this dialogue clarifies the
differences between each author’s conception of scientific realism, revealing
some important common ground and better mapping the contested territory.
Because it addresses such a basic question, and in doing so reveals the
complexity of the dispute, Chakravartty and van Fraassen’s piece provides
an ideal place to start for anyone reading through this entire collection.
JEFFREY FOSS addresses the debate over scientific realism with a
refreshing combination of candour and irreverence. Foss reminds us that our
realist commitments to science should be retail rather than wholesale, so
“philosophers really should respond to the question, ‘Are you a scientific
realist’ with the question, ‘Which bit of science do you have in mind?”’ (26).
At the same time, people’s explicit pronouncements might not be the best
way to determine their true ontological commitments, for their behaviour
often implicitly presumes (or denies) the (likely) truth of various scientific
theories. As Foss sees it, regardless of whether we assent to or dissent from a
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realist interpretation of science in the classroom, at conferences, or in our
publications, each of us tends to treat as real whichever entities “really
matter” (28) to us, pragmatically speaking.
Such a pragmatic focus departs from the usual terms of the scientific
realism debate, which generally focuses on epistemic questions, e.g., do
we know that the theories of modern science are (approximately) true, as
scientific realists assert we do? Several of the papers in this issue begin
by assuming the debate over such epistemic questions inevitably ends in
a stalemate, a view Bradley Monton accurately described as a “growing
consensus” (2007, 3) a full decade ago. Even so, there may still be pragmatic
debates worth having about the relative utility of interpreting science
realistically or anti-realistically, e.g., is it useful to believe that the theories
of modern science are true? HASOK CHANG, for instance, thinks we should
“face the fact that we cannot know whether we have got the objective
Truth about the World (even if such a formulation is meaningful). Realists
go astray by persisting in trying to find a way around this fact, as do
anti-realists in engaging with that obsession” (31). Rather than treating
scientific realism as a descriptive thesis, Chang looks to develop it as a
kind of policy, a commitment to think and act in certain ways, a position
whose virtues can be measured according to whether adopting it proves
“useful for scientists and others who are actually engaged in empirical
inquiries” (31). THEODORE ARABATZIS also suggests that realism might
be best evaluated pragmatically rather than epistemically, specifically by
assessing its potential as a historiographical tool for making sense of scientific
practice. While Arabatzis suggests that historians of science might find
adopting a realist outlook methodologically useful in limited circumstances
(cf. 2001, 2006), HARRY COLLINS maintains his longstanding position that
sociologists of science must always maintain a “methodological relativism”
(39) when studying scientific practice (though he’s come around to the idea
that those same sociologists might find themselves “wallowing in realism” in
other contexts, without contradiction). We can debate whether adopting an
anti-realist attitude is a methodological necessity for the sociologist of science,
of course, which raises an interesting point: even if we assume that the debate
over scientific realism’s epistemic merits inevitably ends in a stalemate, we
might still fruitfully debate its pragmatic merits, investigating when (and
whether) adopting it proves useful for scientists, historians, sociologists, or
anyone else; for the truth of scientific realism, and the utility of treating it
as true, are surely distinct issues.
ARTHUR FINE agrees that it’s futile to continue arguing about whether
scientific realism is true, but he also believes it’s futile to investigate the
utility of adopting a realist outlook, arguing that we’re unlikely to find
people’s philosophical outlooks on science making any practical difference.
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He argues that we should expect scientists, for example, to operate equally
well as scientists whether they’re realists searching for true theories or
anti-realists searching for something else, e.g., theories that are reliable
tools for making predictions. Nevertheless, as several authors have pointed
out over the years this is an empirical matter, so conducting a thorough
historical investigation would be the only way to determine whether realists
and anti-realists typically practice science in distinctive and differentially
fruitful ways (Hendry 1995, 2001; Forbes 2016; cf. Wray 2015; McArthur
2006). Depending on the results of such an investigation, working scientists
might find that the history of science gives them a pragmatic reason to
prefer one philosophical interpretation of science over all others. But, Fine
argues, we shouldn’t expect the history of science to reveal any reason for
anyone to prefer one interpretation over any other, and accordingly he offers
a prescription for which he’s already well-known: stop trying to find any
reason—pragmatic, epistemic, or otherwise—to be a realist or an anti-realist
about science. JOSEPH ROUSE likewise argues that the scientific realism
debate is a fruitless endeavour, though his reasoning is different than Fine’s.
As Rouse sees it, the various conflicts between realists and anti-realists only
arise and seem pressing because both parties share specious philosophical
assumptions. He identifies and challenges several such assumptions, arguing
that once we give them up we’ll have no need to keep asking the kinds of
questions to which realism or anti-realism would be an answer; if we think
about it properly, he suggests, our desire to continue the scientific realism
debate will simply vanish.
ALAN MUSGRAVE also has little interest in continuing to debate
whether one should be a scientific realist, but not because the debate is futile
or confused; rather, as he sees it, the debate is already settled, for realism
about science is the “obvious, commonsensical view” (52). Thus, his concern
is not with defending realism about science against anti-realist challenges,
but rather with figuring out how to avoid slipping into “mad-dog dogmatic
realism” while maintaining a more modest “lap-dog critical realism.” His
considerations take him through many episodes from the history of science
and several classic issues in epistemology and the philosophy of science: the
problem of induction, the nature and limits of scientific explanation, the
possibility of having justified beliefs in the face of uncertainty, the distinction
between observables and unobservables, and so on. His guiding thought
throughout is this: if science is to be believed, as the realist maintains it is,
what does that entail about the way things are? But HOWARD SANKEY
points out that, prima facie, there is an epistemological problem with the
claim that scientific realism is just common sense, for a realist interpretation
of science actually contradicts our commonsense picture of the world. The
issue is that the empirical evidence we have for the scientific picture of
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reality is based on observations made through the lens of our commonsense
understanding of the world, so when our scientific worldview undercuts that
commonsense worldview, it seems to discredit the evidential basis upon
which it was initially accepted. Sankey ultimately believes that this apparent
conflict between common sense and scientific realism is an illusion, but he
reminds us that any would-be scientific realist must be able to explain how
the scientific method can reveal the truth about reality by first looking
through a lens that makes reality appear very different than it truly is.
Many would-be scientific realists have been especially preoccupied with
evading an anti-realist challenge commonly known as the “pessimistic
meta-induction,” most memorably pressed by Larry Laudan (1981). The
idea, roughly, is that history shows that taking a realist attitude toward any
contemporary scientific consensus is an unreliable belief-forming strategy, for
anyone who believed in the truth of Aristotle’s physics, Ptolemy’s cosmos,
Newton’s absolute space, Priestley’s phlogiston-based chemistry, Lavoisier’s
conception of oxygen or heat, or innumerable other examples was eventually
proven wrong. We should, so the argument goes, expect our current theories
to meet the same fate, and accordingly refrain from interpreting modern
science realistically. STATHIS PSILLOS points out that this challenge to
scientific realism has an extensive pedigree not yet fully appreciated, having
been expressed not only by scientists like Poincaré but also by more popular
writers like Tolstoy. Thus, trying to identify the true and belief-worthy
portions of one’s contemporary scientific worldview, while acknowledging
that scientific consensuses shift over time, is not a new concern, nor one
that only vexes philosophers. The lesson for realists and anti-realists is the
same: we make mummies of history if we portray historical scientists as
naïve realists that felt it was impossible (or even unlikely) for their most
stridently defended theories to be replaced one day by something better and
radically different. But to meet the challenge presented by the pessimistic
meta-induction, realists need to develop a principled way of deciding which
portions of any successful scientific theory are true, belief-worthy, and likely
to be retained into the future, as scientists continue to develop better and
better theories. P. KYLE STANFORD suggests that the scientific realism
debate might be more productive if it focused less on debating whether our
current best theories are approximately true, and more on debating whether
it’s possible to predict the future development of science reliably, and thereby
rebut the pessimistic meta-induction. The division between those who believe
we can make such predictions and those who do not, Stanford maintains,
is more important for understanding the scientific realism debate in its
current form than the division between those who think modern science is at
least approximately true and those who believe something else. Focusing on
this issue might also be well-advised for pragmatic reasons. Because realists
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and anti-realists have different expectations regarding the way science will
develop in the future, JAMIE SHAW argues that “our adoption of a realist
or anti-realist position has normative implications for scientific practices”
(83). Using the Human Brain Project as a case study, Shaw argues—pace
Fine but in line with the suggestions of Chang, Arabatzis, and others—that
our philosophical commitments can also have normative implications for
science policy making, e.g., regarding the allocation of research funds. In
that case there would remain great pragmatic value in continuing to ask
whether scientists, philosophers, policy makers, and others should interpret
our current best scientific theories realistically, and whether realists can
predict the future development of science reliably enough to rebut the
pessimistic meta-induction.
Structural realists such as JAMES LADYMAN argue that the structure of
well-established scientific theories is generally retained into whatever theories
eventually replace them, for empirical theories are successful when their
structure identifies “real patterns” in the modalities of nature. Ladyman
offers structural realism as a way to avoid the pessimistic meta-induction,
but he also claims it makes better sense of science as a successful and rational
enterprise than anti-realist alternatives, providing a metaphysical account of
both the various modal structures posited by our current best theories and
the way those structures relate to each other at different scales. ROBIN
HENDRY rightly emphasizes in his contribution that epistemic concerns
about scientific theory change have been raised by many working scientists
throughout history. Through a discussion of the development of structural
theory in the history of chemistry, Hendry shows how the field displays
a much more cumulative progression than physics, especially in light of
the interpretive caution expressed by the chemists who actually developed
structural theory. Like Ladyman, Hendry suggests that physics need not be
treated as the only discipline with ontological authority, and that by paying
more attention and respect to the special sciences the realist will be able to
paint a more conservative picture of scientific theory change that supports a
more optimistic induction.
In any case, PETER VICKERS argues that the historical evidence
fails to support the anti-realist’s pessimistic challenge to the realist. By
showing that the realist can account for most instances of radical theory
change, Vickers argues that “if the historical challenge is supposed to be a
pessimistic induction, the realist is in a strong position since the inductive
base looks rather weak. But if it is not an induction, then it seems to miss
the mark, since the realist proposes a defeasible success-to-truth inference
which will survive one or two historical counter-instances” (120). MARIO
ALAI takes a less historically focused approach in his effort to defend
a popular form of scientific realism—deployment realism—from one of its
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critics. Scientific realists certainly need to ensure that their philosophies of
science are supported by (or at least consistent with) the historical facts of
scientific change, but Alai’s paper shows that the more purely philosophical
issues still matter. If scientific realism can’t serve the philosophical tasks it is
generally meant to (e.g., by explaining the many successes of modern science),
then there is really no reason to defend it against historical challenges from
anti-realists.
Like Ladyman, many would-be scientific realists have developed various
strategies for portraying well-established scientific theories as approximations
of their successors, hoping to rebut the pessimistic meta-induction by
understanding scientific theory change as a conservative process that
vindicates properly considered realist commitments (e.g., Chakravartty 2007,
Psillos 1999). But even if some such strategy succeeds, scientific theory
change poses an additional challenge for any realist seeking to draw her
metaphysical beliefs from the contemporary scientific consensus. As KERRY
MCKENZIE points out, even assuming that our current best scientific
theories will approximate whatever eventually replaces them, this doesn’t
imply that the metaphysical framework we use to make sense of our current
science will “approximate” whatever framework we’ll use to make sense
of future science. Indeed, the realist might be able to argue that classical
mechanics approximates quantum mechanics, but it’s hard to understand
how the different metaphysical frameworks used to give realist interpretations
of those theories—determinism and indeterminism, respectively—could be
said to “approximate” one another in any meaningful sense. So, if scientific
realism depends on interpreting our current best science through some
metaphysical framework, yet we should expect that framework to be replaced
by something entirely different when science changes in the future, then
scientific realism seems to be built on rather shaky metaphysical foundations
in the present. K. BRAD WRAY suggests that realists haven’t actually
managed to rebut the basic pessimistic meta-induction anyway, claiming
that they are generally exaggerating “the anti-realists’ need for evidence.
Any radical change of theory in a field threatens to undermine the realist’s
claim that changes of theory generally preserve the successes of the theories
they replace by appeal to the same mechanisms and entities” (144). This
contrasts with Vickers’s position on this matter, and is reminiscent of
TIMOTHY LYONS’s claim (2002) that the pessimistic meta-induction is not
actually an inductive argument needing a plethora of cases to fuel it, as it is
usually understood, but rather a deductive argument that can be carried
through with a single case. Lyons’s contribution to this volume presents
four challenges to the most common variety of scientific realism, which he
calls “epistemic scientific realism,” i.e., the claim that our most successful
scientific theories are approximately true. He takes these challenges to be
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devastating, but he nevertheless maintains an axiological form of scientific
realism, i.e., a realism about the aims of science: “in changing its theoretical
systems, the scientific enterprise seeks, not truth per se, but an increase
in a particular subclass of true claims, those whose truth—including deep
theoretical truth—is experientially concretized” (148, italics in original). This
claim need not be maintained as an article of faith, however, for it is “an
empirical hypothesis ... a testable tool for further empirical inquiry” (149),
one whose plausibility can be assessed through historical investigations of
the way that scientists actually evaluate competing scientific theories.
PAUL TELLER raises another puzzle for the would-be scientific realist,
for the “complexity of the world ensures the failure of our theoretical
terms to attach to specific extensions, extension-determining characteristics,
and properties and quantities generally” (157). When realists claim that
the terms of their favoured theories refer to real things, he contends,
this is at best an idealization, for these terms are too exacting to refer
successfully to anything, strictly speaking. He goes on to sketch a way of
understanding non-referring representations as true, suggesting that this
can also help make sense of Ronald Giere’s provocative but underdeveloped
“perspectival realism” (2006). While NANCY CARTWRIGHT maintains we
have “considerable evidence” (166) that the theoretical terms of our best
scientific theories successfully refer, she maintains that our most general
(and most prized) scientific theories cannot be given a realist interpretation,
insofar as that would mean taking such universal claims to be literally true,
even approximately speaking. So, instead of asking whether (or arguing that)
our best scientific theories are true, Cartwright proposes that realists should
ask, “What image of the world makes intelligible the successes and failures of
our theoretical practices?” (165). That image, she emphasizes, cannot be one
in which we’ve simply discovered the true, universal laws by which Nature
determines what will happen, for none of our most cherished theoretical
principles can be rendered as both true and universal. Instead, she suggests,
our theoretical practices help us make accurate predictions because Nature
employs a much looser patchwork of local laws and highly abstract principles,
determining what happens “just as we do, from representations and practices
like ours” (172).
Cartwright thinks this practice-centred understanding of how our most
general theoretical principles relate to the world allows us to interpret many
lower-level scientific models realistically, i.e., as true factual claims. But the
scientific models of the future might not be the familiar type she has in mind,
for as CLIFF HOOKER and GILES HOOKER discuss, machine learning
is increasingly being used in the construction of predictive models. The
resulting models are generally black-boxed in a way that makes it difficult (if
not impossible) to give anything like a realist interpretation of them. While
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there are reasons for the realist to find this concerning, the use of machine
learning is not obviously a bad thing from the perspective of someone seeking
only to predict the behaviour of some system, device, or phenomenon. Would
it have been better or worse, the Hookers ask us to consider, if Newton had
used machine learning to develop a computer program capable of making
incredibly precise and accurate predictions of how any system of massive
objects will interact, but incapable of revealing the inverse square law of
universal gravitation? In general, is it better to have theories and models that
paint a conceivable picture of reality, or instead to have a set of ontologically
uninterpretable algorithms that make far better predictions (so far as we
know!)? Perhaps future scientists will come to prefer the latter, but here’s
the issue: if scientific realists want to update their beliefs about reality as
science itself develops, but the future of science is the production of models
that permit no realist interpretation, what would that mean for the future
of the scientific realism debate?
And the future of the debate over scientific realism is, of course, exactly
what this collection is about. In the end, what it makes most clear is that
there is no significant consensus regarding what the future of the scientific
realism debate should be; as a corollary, however, it also makes clear that
the future of this debate is full of possibilities.
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